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Editorial
The Politics of Pragmatism: Southeast Asia’s
New Free Trade Bilateralism
Jürgen Rüland
Bilateral and mini-lateral free trade projects (FTAs) have proliferated in the Asia-
Paciﬁc since the late 1990s. Between 1997 and 2004, their number increased
from seven to seventy-two, with thirty-one concluded and the others at different
stages of negotiation (Dent 2005:290). Political economists are still puzzled by
this phenomenon. The questions they usually raise focus on two major issues:
Does free trade bilateralism foster Southeast Asian and East Asian regionalism
and to what extent are bilateral and mini-lateral FTAs compatible with a global
multilateral trade order?
The views in the literature diverge largely on these two questions. Advocates
of bilateral and mini-lateral FTAs view them as supplementary to the global trade
regime. The same group of scholars also tends to regard free trade bilateralism
as an engine of Southeast Asian economic integration with stimulating effects
on Southeast Asian regionalism. Others, however, are more sceptical. They
question the compatibility of bilateral FTAs with global trade liberalization under
the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and they have reservations
about their contribution to Southeast Asian community building. The three
contributions assembled in this issue of Südostasien aktuell shed some light on
these questions. They examine the motivations of Southeast Asian governments
and their partners inside and outside the Southeast Asian region to negotiate
bilateral FTAs, they assess the impact of bilateral FTAs on the cohesiveness of
Southeast Asian regionalism, they scrutinize the relationship between bilateral
FTAs and global trade multilateralism and they raise the question in what way
bilateral trade liberalization can be combined with other global concerns such as
sustainable development and environmental issues.
Southeast Asian regionalism and, in particular, its ﬂagship, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have been severely tested by the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis. Viewed from hindsight, most pundits agree that ASEAN was virtually
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paralyzed by the crisis (Acharya 1999; Funston 1999; Wesley 1999; Rüland 2000).
Its failure to contribute meaningfully to crisis management triggered acrimonious
debates about the “ASEAN Way” as the embodiment the grouping’s norms of
cooperation, the resurgence of bilateral disputes unimaginable before the crisis
and relapses into unilateralist behaviour. Apart from calls to discard or at least
dilute ASEAN’s quasi-sacred norm of non-intervention into the internal affairs
of its members, exit behaviour weakened ASEAN’s ﬂedgling regional economic
integration under the auspices of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (Rüland
2000). In his article, Christopher M. Dent mentions Malaysia’s decision to delay
the reduction of tariffs on automotive product imports in the AFTA schedule
by three years, from 2002 to 2005. Indonesia and the Philippines unilaterally
delayed AFTA liberalization of their respective petrochemical industries and the
frequency of complaints over new non-tariff trade barriers by AFTA members
increased markedly.
Yet, for many observers ASEAN recovered quickly from the crisis as evidenced
by the ﬂurry of new regional cooperation initiatives launched by ASEAN or
individual ASEAN members. Among them are ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the
West Paciﬁc Forum, the Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Indian Ocean Rim Association for
Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), P-3,1 P-5,2 the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-
Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), the Chiang Mai Initiative
and recently, in December 2005, the East Asian Summit. Intraregional initiatives
such as ASEAN’s Bali Concord II, which envisaged the creation of an ASEAN
economic, security and cultural community, the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA),
the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), moves to draft an ASEAN Charter and
the proliferating negotiations for bilateral FTAs were likewise taken as evidence
for the resilience of Southeast Asian regionalism. Proposals to form an Asian
Monetary Fund (AMF), the Chiang Mai Initiative of bilateral currency swaps
accords and academic debates about a common East Asian currency have inspired
1 P-3 is the term for a mini-lateral free trade area that by 2005 also became known as Trans-
Paciﬁc Strategic Economic Partnership (SEP). Original members were Singapore, New Zealand
and Chile, in 2005 Brunei Darussalam joined the grouping as the fourth member.
2 A mini-lateral trade grouping consisting of Singapore, Chile, the U.S., New Zealand and
Australia was proposed by Singapore after the APEC trade liberalization process came to a halt
during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
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Heribert Dieter to speak of an emerging East Asian “monetary regionalism”
(Dieter 2000; Dieter/Higgott 2006) which skips earlier stages of economic
integration. Christopher M. Dent’s concept of a “lattice regionalism” also charts
a non-conventional course towards regional economic integration (Dent 2003).
It rests on the expectation that bilateral and mini-lateral FTAs intensify economic
interactions and create new interdependencies, a key requisite for closer regional
cooperation.
In his contribution to this issue of Südostasien aktuell, with the beneﬁt of
years of intense empirical research (Dent 2005, 2006), Dent is more circumspect
about the impact of bilateral FTAs on (Southeast) Asian regionalism than in his
early writings on the theme. Trade bilateralism, that is his sobering conclusion,
is exacerbating the developmental divide in Southeast Asia. Bilateral FTAs,
especially with developed economies such as the United States or Japan, tend
to reproduce and even deepen pre-existing economic asymmetries. Thus, in
Southeast Asia only Singapore and Malaysia may fully exploit the improved
market access for their exports and attract sizeable foreign direct investment.
The other economies of the region, especially those of ASEAN’s new mainland
members, are struggling with serious technological, industrial and institutional
capacity deﬁcits. Their trade ofﬁcials lack the technical expertise needed to
secure beneﬁcial deals and their bureaucracies are ill equipped to comply with
the increasingly complex and technically complicated trade regulations. While
bilateral FTAs produce exorbitant governance costs (i.e. costs to establish and
strengthen institutions) for Southeast Asia’s economically less advanced countries,
WTO Plus regulations imposed on them may even dim their developmental
perspectives. Dent cites the example of Thailand’s infant e-banking sector
which the American government demands to be opened to the vastly superior
U.S. banking industry. Moreover, by opting for the bilateral approach, ASEAN
countries deprive themselves of an important negotiating advantage: Without a
common strategy they are played off against each other by economically more
powerful partners and have no chance to beneﬁt collectively from concessions
through most favoured nation (MFN) treatment. Worse even, one may argue,
competitive deals erode the trust and social capital among ASEAN member states
built up over many years through the “ASEAN Way.” As a result, ASEAN’s
actorness is suffering, making it more difﬁcult for the grouping to speak with
one voice and act collectively in global or interregional multilateral forums such
as the WTO, the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the Asia-Europe
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Meeting (ASEM). Dent thus concludes that regional level trade liberalization
schemes such as AFTA are more conducive to regional integration. They are more
inclusive and more equitable, especially if they are combined with development
aid for the peripheral regions.
The second major issue concerns the question whether bilateral FTAs are
building or stumbling blocks for global trade multilateralism. Many Southeast
Asian government ofﬁcials, but scholars as well, value them as “second best”
option in the face of a deepening crisis of global trade multilateralism. For Barry
Desker, director of the renowned Singaporean S. Rajaratnam School of Interna-
tional Studies (formerly Institute of Development and Strategic Studies, IDSS),
bilateral FTAs stand for the “politically attainable” in “adverse circumstances”
(Desker 2004:4). All three contributors to this issue thus agree that the failed
WTO ministerials of Seattle (1999) and Cancun (2003) and the slow pace of
regional trade liberalization have been major motivations for the Singaporean and
the Thai governments to spearhead Asian trade bilateralism and other Southeast
Asian governments to join the bandwagon.
Those in favour of free trade bilateralism also contend that bilateral agree-
ments socialize states in “hard law” (i.e. regulations that are binding, precise
and enforceable) (Abbott/Snidal (2000) and thus strengthen rule-based multilat-
eralism. Stephen Hoadley, in his contribution on America’s FTA strategy for
Asia, seems to concur with this view. After all, free-riding is more difﬁcult in
bilateral relationships than in multilateral settings (except, of course, where one
of the partners is a hegemonic power). Bilateral free trade areas also maintain
the ﬁction of free trade at a time when it is jeopardized by stagnating global trade
negotiations. By creating “WTO-Plus” arrangements they have the potential to
revitalize or even advance the global trade agenda.
Critics, however, emphasize that bilateral FTAs generate many contradictory
rules as protagonists negotiate special arrangements for each FTA. FTAs differ in
scope of liberalization, rules of origin, “broad band” elements and implementation
schedules (Dent 2005:297f.). In fact, “each FTA is unique,” as Dent stresses
in his article. There is no template on which FTAs can be built. The technical
variation and the complexity of these rules severely reduce transparency, enhance
transaction costs and explain why multilateralizing bilateral agreements – as
called for by Okamoto - faces many obstacles (Okamoto 2003). The diversity of
rules has discriminating effects and is at variance with multilateralism deﬁned
as an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states
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based on expectations of diffuse reciprocity (Ruggie 1992:571).
The diversity of bilateral FTAs and the difﬁculties of “harmonizing and
rationalizing” them into multilateral agreements (Dent 2005:312) must also be
attributed to varying geo-political and strategic interests motivating governments
to conclude bilateral FTAs. Stephen Hoadley shows in his contribution how the
U.S. used bilateral FTAs to reward friendly governments and to back up security
cooperation with Asian partners in the war against terror. Hoadley however
denies that American free trade bilateralism in Southeast Asia, as reﬂected in the
Bush administration’s Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI), the U.S.-Singapore
FTA and ongoing negotiations with Thailand and Malaysia, is a device to establish
U.S. hegemony in the region. Yet, apart from the economic interests pursued
by bilateral FTAs, it can hardly be denied that they constitute an avenue for
increasing Washington’s political inﬂuence in Southeast Asia. Not surprisingly,
thus, China and Japan have also discovered trade bilateralism as a utility in their
competition over inﬂuence in the Southeast Asian region. Bilateral trade deals
may thus be viewed as a strategy for neo-mercantilist balancing games within the
region and between major regional and extra-regional great powers. For Jagdish
Bhagwati, citing U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, trade bilateralism is
the economic equivalent of the ad hoc “coalition of the willing” in the security
domain (Bhagwati 2004:53). Hoadley is thus right when he states that “state
leaders are indifferent as to the absolute merits of international trade regimes,
regional organizations, bilateral deals, or unilateral initiatives, but rather choose
pragmatically among them to maximize relative economic and security gains.” In
fact, free trade bilateralism tallies well with the penchant for pragmatic realpolitik
dominant among Southeast Asian foreign policymaking elites.
Astrid Fritz-Carrapatoso’s article adds another facet to the debate on the
compatibility of bilateral FTAs with multilateralism. Her study traces the enor-
mous difﬁculties of linking trade with other global concerns such as sustainable
development and protection of the environment. Environmental clauses in trade
agreements are usually promoted by developed countries, while economically less
advanced countries suspect them as “green protectionism.” Behind-the-border
changes as required by environmental clauses are also at variance with the
“ASEAN Way” and its strong emphasis on national sovereignty. Yet, despite their
institutional and technical capacity deﬁcits, which pose great obstacles for them
to comply with environmental commitments, Southeast Asian governments are
under certain conditions willing to accept non-binding (and in the case of the
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Trans-Paciﬁc SEP even binding, albeit non-enforceable) environmental clauses in
trade agreements. This is the case when the partners are smaller countries like
New Zealand or Chile, or when the economic beneﬁts of the deal promise to
exceed the costs of environmental commitments. While civil society pressure
for sustainable development is still weak in Southeast Asian countries, it is much
stronger in developed and, here, in particular, Western countries. It remains
however to be seen as to what extent the inclusion of non-binding environmental
clauses is sufﬁcient to create peer pressure and to foster norm internalization
among Southeast Asian governments and publics.
The three articles assembled in this issue of Südostasien aktuell have been
presented as draft versions in a workshop jointly organized by the Department
of Political Science of the University of Freiburg, the Carl Schurz Haus (German-
American Institute) Freiburg and the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute Freiburg on
6 July 2006. The editor expresses his gratitude to the University of Freiburg and
the co-organizing institutes for funding the event, and the Carl Schurz Haus for
hosting the workshop in its newly inaugurated premises.
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